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Action understanding lies at the heart of social interaction. Prior research has often
conceptualized this capacity in terms of a motoric matching of observed actions to an
action in one’s motor repertoire, but has ignored the role of object information. In this
manuscript, we set out an alternative conception of intention understanding, which places
the role of objects as central to our observation and comprehension of the actions of
others. We outline the current understanding of the interconnectedness of action and
object knowledge, demonstrating how both rely heavily on the other. We then propose a
novel framework, the affordance-matching hypothesis, which incorporates these findings
into a simple model of action understanding, in which object knowledge—what an object is
for and how it is used—can inform and constrain both action interpretation and prediction.
We will review recent empirical evidence that supports such an object-based view of action
understanding and we relate the affordance matching hypothesis to recent proposals that
have re-conceptualized the role of mirror neurons in action understanding.
Keywords: affordances, action understanding, action prediction, object function, object manipulation
ACTION UNDERSTANDING IN AN OBJECT CONTEXT: THE
AFFORDANCE-MATCHING HYPOTHESIS
Action understanding lies at the heart of social interaction.
Knowing the goal of another person’s action allows one to infer
their internal states, predict what they are going to do next, and
to coordinate one’s own actions with theirs (Hamilton, 2009;
Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009; Bach et al., 2011). The ability to
understand others’ actions is often assumed to rely on special-
ized brain systems that “directly map” observed motor acts to a
corresponding action in the observer’s motor repertoire, allowing
it to be identified and its goal to be derived (Rizzolatti et al.,
2001; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009). In monkeys, mirror neurons
have been discovered that fire both when the monkey executes a
particular action, and when it merely observes the same actions
being executed by someone else (Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese
et al., 1996). Also for humans, there is now converging evidence
that action observation engages neuronal ensembles also involved
in action execution, and that these ensembles code specific actions
across both domains (Fadiga et al., 1995; Chong et al., 2008;
Mukamel et al., 2010; Oosterhof et al., 2010, 2012).
Yet, even though there remains little doubt that action-related
representations are also activated when one observes others act,
attempts to directly link these activations to goal understanding
have been less successful. There is little evidence from lesion
or transcranial magnetic stimulation studies that would reveal a
critical role of motor-related brain areas for understanding the
actions of others (Catmur et al., 2007; Negri et al., 2007; Kalénine
et al., 2010; but see Avenanti et al., 2013b; Rogalsky et al., 2013).
Similarly, whereas some imaging studies revealed an involvement
of mirror-related areas in action understanding tasks, such as
the inferior frontal gyrus or the anterior intraparietal sulcus
(Iacoboni et al., 2005; Hamilton and Grafton, 2006), a growing
number of studies point to areas outside the classical observation-
execution matching system, such as the medial prefrontal cortex,
the superior temporal sulcus, or the posterior temporal lobe
(Brass et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2008; Liepelt et al., 2008b;
Kalénine et al., 2010). Others reveal that mirror-related brain
activations are primarily found for meaningless actions, where
kinematics is the only information available (Hétu et al., 2011),
substantially limiting the theoretical reach of motoric matching
accounts. Finally, there are theoretical reasons why motor or
kinesthetic information, on which direct matching is assumed
to be based, does not suffice to unambiguously identify the
goals of complex human motor acts. For example, most human
motor behaviors (e.g., picking up something) can be performed
in various circumstances to achieve a variety of goals, such that
a one-to-one mapping of actions to goals is not possible (e.g.,
Hurford, 2004; Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Uithol et al., 2011).
These observations have posed a challenge to motor-matching
views of action understanding, and have led several theorists to
suggest either that the direct-matching account has to be revised,
or that motoric matching cannot be the primary driver of action
understanding in humans (Bach et al., 2005, 2011; Csibra, 2008;
Kilner, 2011). Here, we propose a new view, which incorporates
the available data on motoric matching and mirror neurons, but
places them in a model of action understanding that emphasizes
the role of object knowledge, which helps predict and interpret
any observed motor act. Such a combined model, we argue, can
explain extant data and account for several of the observed incon-
sistencies. In the following, we will (1) briefly review the current
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understanding of action knowledge associated with objects; (2)
sketch a basic model of how this knowledge could contribute
to action understanding, and (3) review common findings in
humans and monkeys on the use of object-related knowledge in
action observation in the light of this model.
Throughout the manuscript we use the term “goal” to refer
to desired states of the environment, one’s own body, or mind.
Following Csibra (2008), we presuppose that goals can be located
at different levels, reaching from simple, low level goals, such as
completing a grasp or hammering in a nail, to distal goals such as
hanging up a picture frame. We use the term “action” to refer to
bodily movements that are performed with the express purpose
to achieve such a goal. The term “target objects” or “recipient
objects” are used to refer to the objects affected by these actions.
ACTION INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OBJECTS
The effective use of objects sets humans apart from even their
closest relatives in the animal kingdom (e.g., Johnson-Frey, 2003).
Most human actions involve objects, either as the recipient to
be acted upon, or as a tool to be acted with (cf. Johnson-Frey
et al., 2003). The capacity to use objects has unlocked a vast range
of effects humans can achieve in the environment that would
otherwise be outside the scope of their effector systems. They
range from cutting with a knife, shooting a gun, to sending a
text message with a mobile phone, and traveling the world with
various types of vehicle.
The capacity for using these objects is underpinned by a spe-
cialized network in the left hemisphere, spanning frontal, parietal
and temporal regions (Haaland et al., 2000; Johnson-Frey, 2004,
for review; Binkofski and Buxbaum, 2013; for reviews, see van
Elk et al., 2013), some of which appear to be unique to humans
(Orban et al., 2006; Peeters et al., 2009, 2013). This network
supports object-directed action by coding (at least) two types of
information. For every object, humans learn not only what goals
they can, in principle, achieve with it (“function knowledge”), but
also the motor behaviors that are required to achieve these goals
(“manipulation knowledge”) (Kelemen, 1999; Buxbaum et al.,
2000; Buxbaum and Saffran, 2002; Casby, 2003, for a review, see
van Elk et al., 2013). When growing up, one learns, for example,
that a tap is for getting water, and that this requires turning it
clockwise. Similarly, one learns that a knife is for cutting, and
that this requires alternating forward and backwards movements,
with an amount of downward pressure that depends on the object
one wants to cut. Objects, therefore, seem to provide one with
the same links between potential action outcomes and required
motor behaviors that are central to the control of voluntary action
(see Hommel et al., 2001). These links allow objects to act as an
interface between an actor’s goals and their motor system (cf. van
Elk et al., 2013). They allow actors not only to decide whether
they want to use an object (by matching object functions to one’s
current goals), but also—if they do—to derive how to utilize
the object to achieve the desired result (by using manipulation
knowledge to guide one’s motor behaviors with the object).
Whenever people interact with objects at least some aspects
of this knowledge are activated automatically (e.g., Bub et al.,
2003, 2008). In the monkey premotor cortex, so called canonical
neurons have been discovered that fire not only when the monkey
executes a specific grip (e.g., a precision grip), but also if it
merely observes an object which requires such a grip (a small
object such as a peanut), indicating a role in linking objects
to actions (Murata et al., 1997). Similar evidence comes from
behavioral and imaging studies in humans. Passively viewing an
object, for example, has been shown to activate not only the
basic movements for reaching and grasping it (e.g., Tucker and
Ellis, 1998, 2001; Grèzes et al., 2003; Buccino et al., 2009), but
also—under appropriate circumstances—the more idiosyncratic
movements required for realizing the objects’ specific functions
(e.g., the swinging movement required to hammer in a nail; for
a review, Creem and Proffitt, 2001; Bach et al., 2005; Bub et al.,
2008; van Elk et al., 2009; see van Elk et al., 2013).
Action information is such a central aspect of human object
knowledge that it directly affects object identification and catego-
rization. Already in 12 month old infants, object function con-
tributes to object individuation and categorization (e.g., Booth
andWaxman, 2002; Kingo and Krøjgaard, 2012). In adults, several
studies have shown that an object is identified more easily when
preceded by an object with either a similar or complementary
function (e.g., corkscrew, wine bottle) (e.g., Riddoch et al., 2003;
Bach et al., 2005; McNair and Harris, 2013), or one that requires
similar forms of manipulation (e.g., both a piano and a keyboard
require typing, Helbig et al., 2006; McNair and Harris, 2012).
These results are mirrored on a neurophysiological level by fMRI
repetition suppression effects for objects associated with similar
actions, even when these objects are only passively viewed (e.g.,
Yee et al., 2010; Valyear et al., 2012).
Other studies document the tight coupling of function and
manipulation knowledge (see van Elk et al., 2013 for a review).
Several imaging studies have revealed at least partially overlapping
cortical representations for function and manipulation knowl-
edge (Kellenbach et al., 2003; Boronat et al., 2005; Canessa et al.,
2008). Similarly, it has been known for a long time that lesions
to the left-hemispheric tool networks disrupt knowledge not
only of what the objects are “for”—goals that can achieved with
them—but also knowledge of how they have to be used, while
disruptions of function knowledge only are rare (Ochipa et al.,
1989; Hodges et al., 1999; Haaland et al., 2000; Buxbaum and
Saffran, 2002; Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009). In addition, there
is a host of behavioral studies demonstrating that the activation
of manipulation knowledge is tied to the prior activation of
function/goal information, both on the behavioral (Bach et al.,
2005; van Elk et al., 2009; McNair and Harris, 2013) and on the
neurophysiological level (Bach et al., 2010b). For example, in a
recent study based on Tucker and Ellis (1998) classic affordance
paradigm, it was shown that which of an object’s manipulation
was retrieved—grasping for placing or for functional object use—
was determined by which goal was suggested by the surrounding
context (see also Valyear et al., 2011; Kalénine et al., 2013).
THE AFFORDANCE-MATCHING HYPOTHESIS
The basic assumption of the affordance-matching hypothesis is
that manipulation and function knowledge about objects cannot
only be used during action execution, but also for predicting and
understanding the actions of others. In the same way as object
function and manipulation knowledge can act as the interface
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between one’s own goal and motor systems, it can provide one
with similar links between the inferred goals of others and their
likely motor behaviors.
The affordance-matching hypothesis has two main features.
The first feature is the assumption that whenever we see some-
body else in the vicinity of objects, the associated function and
manipulation knowledge is retrieved (see Figure 1, top panel,
cf. Rochat, 1995; Stoffregen et al., 1999; Costantini et al., 2011;
Cardellicchio et al., 2013; for a review, see Creem-Regehr et al.,
2013), constrained by further contextual cues such as other
objects or social signals (see below). As is the case for one’s own
actions, this provides the observer with immediate knowledge
about the potential goals of the actor (through function knowl-
edge: what the objects are for), as well as the bodily movements
that would be required to achieve these goals (through manipu-
lation knowledge: how the objects have to be used). Imagine, for
example, the unpleasant situation of standing across from another
person holding a gun. Object knowledge specifies that a gun is for
shooting (function knowledge), and that, in order to achieve this
goal, the gun would have to be raised, pointed at the target, and
fired (manipulation knowledge). Thus, simply deriving function
and manipulation knowledge about the objects somebody acts
with—without taking into account the specific motor behav-
ior they perform—can serve both interpretative and predictive
roles. Function knowledge supports action interpretation because
knowledge about what an object is for provides insights into the
potential goals of the other person. In contrast, manipulation
knowledge aids action prediction, because knowledge about how
an object is handled highlights potentially forthcoming actions,
supporting more efficient identification and interaction.
The second major feature of the affordance-matching hypoth-
esis is the assumption that, as during action production, an
object’s function and manipulation knowledge are coupled, so
that activating one also activates the other. This coupling sub-
stantially enhances the predictive and interpretative contributions
of object knowledge, depending on the flow of information for
function to manipulation knowledge or vice versa (Figure 1,
middle and lower panel). Consider, for example, that most objects
have multiple uses—even the gun could be given to someone,
holstered, or harmlessly laid on a table—and there are typically
multiple objects in a scene, each associated with a number of
functional manipulations. We assume that these objects are not
weighted equally during action observation. Instead, as it is
the case during own action planning (e.g., Valyear et al., 2011;
Kalénine et al., 2013), those objects will be highlighted, the
functions of which are most in line with the (inferred) goals of the
actor. Moreover, because object knowledge ties these functions to
specific manipulations, the identification of such a functionally
matching object can directly activate the associated motor behav-
iors, leading to action predictions that are in line with the inferred
goals (Figure 1, middle panel).
Previous research has established that additional objects in
the environment—especially potential recipients of the action—
are another major determinant for which action goals are pre-
activated. Seeing a person holding a hammer might activate
hammering movements to a stronger extent when this person is
also holding a nail than when they are holding a toolbox (cf. Bach
FIGURE 1 | Affordance matching during action observation. Top panel:
object identification provides information about what an object is for
(function knowledge) and how it has to be manipulated to realize this
function (manipulation knowledge). Middle panel: flow of information during
action prediction. Inferred goals of an actor activates objects with matching
functions. The associated manipulation knowledge predicts forthcoming
movements. Bottom panel: flow of information during action interpretation.
Observed behavior that matches an object’s manipulation activates the
corresponding function, which in turn provides information about the actor’s
goal.
et al., 2005, 2009, 2010b; Yoon et al., 2012; McNair and Harris,
2013). Social cues are another important influence, as cues such as
gaze or emotional expression can directly supply action goals. In
the above example, if the person shows an angry facial expression
and tone of voice, his actions of raising the arm and pulling the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 254 | 3
Bach et al. The affordance-matching hypothesis
FIGURE 2 | Concrete example for the flow of information during action
prediction and interpretation. Top panel: Action prediction. Prior
knowledge of an actor’s goal (shooting) activates knowledge of objects with
corresponding function. The associated manipulation knowledge (raising
the arm, pulling the trigger) supports action prediction by biasing visual
perception towards these manipulations. Lower panel: Action
interpretation. Observed behavior is matched to the manipulations
supported by the object. If both match, the corresponding functions are
activated, providing likely goals of the actor.
trigger will be foremost in our mind (Figure 2, upper panel),
while a calm voice and friendly manner might at least make us
consider the other possible meaningful actions one can do with a
gun.
Here, therefore, flow of information from object function to
manipulation aided action prediction. In contrast, the interpre-
tation of observed motor behavior can benefit from the reverse
flow of information: from manipulation to function knowledge.
Note that, in many cases, an observed motor act is, by itself,
devoid of meaning. The same—or at least very similar—motor
act can be used for various purposes. Consider the everyday
actions of inserting a credit card into a cash machine, or a
train ticket into a ticker canceller. Motorically, both actions are
virtually identical, but they serve very different goals (cf. Bach
et al., 2005, 2009, 2010b; Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005). However,
knowledge about the objects involved can directly disambiguate
such alternative interpretations. Because object knowledge links
the different manipulations of a tool with distinct functions, the
detection of a motor behavior that matches such a manipulation
can directly confirm the associated action goal (Figure 1, lower
panel). In the above example, if the person with the gun in the
hand indeed raises their arm, the interpretation is clear: with a
gun in the hand, the otherwise meaningless motion of raising the
arm is predicted by the goal of shooting (Figure 2, lower panel).
This interpretative role of object knowledge becomes partic-
ularly important if one considers that not only motor acts are
ambiguous, but the functions of objects are as well. Some objects
can be handled in different ways, and produce different outcomes.
For example, a fork can be used to spear a carrot (in order to
subsequently eat it) or to mash it. Here, the object context is
identical and therefore does not allow one to anticipate one of
these goals. However, a match of the actually observed motor
behavior with one of the objects’ functional uses immediately
provides such disambiguating information. As a consequence, just
seeing how the fork is held may be enough to disambiguate its
subsequent use.
Together, therefore, the affordance-matching hypothesis spec-
ifies the different pathways of how objects—via the associated
function and manipulation knowledge—can make powerful con-
tributions to both action interpretation and action prediction.
For descriptive purposes, the flow of information through these
pathways has been described mostly separately. Of course, inter-
pretation and prediction in most cases interact strongly, with one
constantly influencing the other. For example, a confirmed action
prediction will verify inferred action goals, which, in turn, will
trigger new action predictions, that can be either confirmed or
disconfirmed by new sensory evidence.
EVIDENCE FOR AFFORDANCE MATCHING IN ACTION
OBSERVATION
Several recent studies have documented the major role of object
information in action understanding (e.g., Hernik and Csibra,
2009; Hunnius and Bekkering, 2010; Bach et al., 2014). They do
not only show that object-based modes of action understanding
can complement the more motoric modes that have been the
focus of most prior work (e.g., Boria et al., 2009), but also
support the more specific interactions between object and motor
information predicted by the affordance-matching hypothesis. In
the following, we will briefly review some important findings.
OBJECT MANIPULATION KNOWLEDGE GUIDES ACTION PREDICTION
The affordance-matching hypothesis posits that people do not
only derive manipulation knowledge for the objects relevant to
their goals, but also for the objects relevant for the goals of
others (for a similar argument, see Creem-Regehr et al., 2013).
This knowledge directly constrains the motor behaviors expected
from the other person, allowing for efficient action prediction.
Indeed, there is ample evidence from studies in children and
adults that human observers do not only interpret actions post-
hoc, but actively predict how they will continue (e.g., Flanagan
and Johansson, 2003; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Uithol and Paulus,
2013). Several studies have demonstrated that these predictions
are directly informed by objects and knowledge about the move-
ments required for their effective manipulation. Hunnius and
Bekkering (2010), for example, have revealed that when children
observe others interacting with objects, their gaze reflects their
predictions about the actions to follow. Seeing somebody reach
and grasp a cup, therefore, evokes gaze shifts towards the mouth,
while seeing somebody grasp a telephone evokes gaze shifts
towards the ear, providing direct evidence that an object’s typical
manipulation can guide action prediction.
Studies on adults similarly support the notion that observers
routinely rely on object knowledge to predict forthcoming
actions. A range of studies has established that when people see
somebody else next to an object, the most effective grip to interact
with it is activated, as if they were in the position of the observed
actor (cf. Costantini et al., 2011; Cardellicchio et al., 2013). More-
over, consistent with the affordance-matching hypothesis, the
activations of these actions has a predictive function and biases
perceptual expectations towards these actions. In a recent study
by Jacquet et al. (2012) participants identified, in a condition
of visual uncertainty, complete and incomplete object-directed
actions. For each object, an optimal (low biomechanical cost) and
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sub-optimal (high biomechanical cost) movement was presented.
As predicted from affordance matching, participants more easily
identified the movements optimally suited to reach a given object,
in line with the idea that extracted affordances have biased visual
perception towards these actions.
Other studies confirm that contextual information about the
currently relevant action goals guides attention towards relevant
objects (Bach et al., 2005, 2009, 2010b; van Elk et al., 2009).
Social cues—particularly another person’s gaze—are one such
source of information (see Becchio et al., 2008 for a review).
In human actors, gaze is typically directed at the target of an
action, even before it is reached (Land and Furneaux, 1997; Land
et al., 1999). Human observers, as well as some primates, are
aware of this relationship and exploit it to predict the action’s
target (Phillips et al., 1992; Call and Tomasello, 1998; Santos and
Hauser, 1999; Scerif et al., 2004). If this is the case, then other
people’s gaze should determine for which objects manipulation
knowledge is retrieved. Indeed, Castiello (2003; see also Pierno
et al., 2006) reported that observing object-directed gaze primes
reaches towards the object, just as if one were directly observing
this action. Similarly, research using fMRI has shown that observ-
ing an object-directed gaze activates similar premotor and parietal
regions as when actually observing an action towards this object
(Pierno et al., 2006, 2008). These findings directly support our
contention that gaze implies a goal to interact with an object,
which in turn activates the necessary actions (cf. “intentional
imposition”, Becchio et al., 2008).
Another important source of information is the other objects
in a scene, which—if they complement the object the actor is
wielding—can directly suggest an action goal (e.g., a key and a
keyhole suggest the goal of locking/unlocking a door, but key
and a slot of a screw do not). It has been known for a while
that patients with visual extinction, who are generally unable to
perceive more than one object at a time, are able to perceive two
objects if the objects show such a functional match (Riddoch
et al., 2003). Importantly, perception was further enhanced when
the spatial relationship between the objects matched the objects’
required manipulation (e.g., corkscrew above rather than below
a wine bottle), supporting the idea that implied goals suggested
by functionally matching objects drove the retrieval of manipu-
lation knowledge (for a similar effect in healthy adults using the
attentional blink paradigm, see McNair and Harris, 2013).
In a behavioral study, we directly tested the idea that action
goals implied by potential action recipients are enough to activate
the required manipulation (Bach et al., 2005). Participants had to
judge whether a tool (e.g., a credit card) was handled correctly
according to its typical manipulation, but varied whether a recip-
ient object was present that either matched the typical function
of the object or did not (e.g., slot of a cash machine, or a slot
of ticket canceller), while controlling whether the action could
be physically carried out (i.e., the credit card could just as easily
be inserted into the slot of the ticket canceller as into the cash
machine). As predicted, we found that manipulation judgments
of others’ actions were sped up by the presence of functionally
congruent objects, in line with the idea that implied action goals
pre-activate associated manipulations (for similar findings, see
van Elk et al., 2009; Yoon et al., 2010; Kalénine et al., 2013).
OBSERVED MANIPULATIONS CONFIRM ACTION INTERPRETATIONS
The above studies show that affordances of objects combine
with contextual and social information about the actor’s goals
in the prediction of forthcoming actions. What happens if such
a prediction is indeed confirmed? According to the affordance-
matching hypothesis, each function of an object is associated with
a specific manipulation that is necessary to achieve this goal. A
match between an actually observed action and this predicted
manipulation allows observers to infer the action’s function: the
object can lend the action its meaning.
On a general level, this predicts that, next to movements,
objects should be a prime determinant of how actions are under-
stood and distinguished from one another. From the developmen-
tal literature, such object-based effects of action understanding
are well known. In a seminal study, Woodward (1998) habituated
infants to seeing another person reach for one of two objects.
After habituation, the position of the objects was switched, so
that the same movement would now reach a different object, and
a different movement would reach the same object. The results
showed that, indeed, infants dis-habituated more to changes of
the objects than to changes of the movements, even though the
change of movement was more visually different from the habit-
uated action. This suggests that infants interpret other people’s
reaches as attempts to reach a particular object, such that changes
of these objects, but not of the movements required to reach
them, change the “meaning” of the action. Indeed, the effects were
absent when the object was grasped by an inanimate object with
similar shape as the human arm, suggesting that the effect indeed
relates to the goals associated with the objects (but see Uithol and
Paulus, 2013, for a different interpretation).Moreover, other stud-
ies show that the effects depend on the infants’ prior interaction
experience with the objects, in line with the idea that the effects
emerge from ones’ own object knowledge (Sommerville et al.,
2005, 2008).
Of course, this study only shows on a basic level that objects
determine the inferred goal of an observed motor act. Since then,
it has been demonstrated that these goal attributions indeed rely
on a sophisticated matching of observed actions to the manip-
ulations required to interact with the target object. For example,
in the case of simple grasps, the volumetrics of the objects provide
affordances for a specific type of grip, with larger objects affording
whole hand power grips and smaller objects affording precision
grips (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998, 2001). There are now several
studies—in children and adults—that show that inferences about
a reach’s goal are based on such grip-object matches. For example,
Fischer et al. (2008) demonstrated that simply showing a certain
type of grip triggers anticipative eye movements towards a goal
object with a corresponding shape, implying an identification of
the action goal based on affordance matching. This capacity is
well established already in infants. Daum et al. (2009) have shown
that at 6–9months, children routinely establish such relationships
between grasps and goal objects, showing dis-habituation when
grasping an object that was incongruent with the initial grip.
Even at this age, therefore, children “know” that different objects
require different grips, and they can anticipate the goal of an
action based on the matching between this affordance, and the
observed grip.
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Importantly, and in line with the affordance-matching hypoth-
esis, these effects are guided by the same object manipulation
knowledge that guides an individual’s own actions. Infants’ abil-
ity for affordance matching directly depends on their ability
to exploit these affordances for their own actions. Only those
children who used accurate pre-shaping of their own hand to the
different object types used this match information to anticipate
which object would be grasped (Daum et al., 2011). Similar
evidence comes from a study tracking infants’ eye movements.
As in adults, congruent shapes of the hands allowed infants to
anticipate (fixate) the goal object of a reach, and this ability was
dependent on their own grasping ability (Ambrosini et al., 2013).
Such effects are not restricted to grasping. In tool use, the
manipulations one has to perform with a given tool to realize its
function are, if anything, even more distinct (e.g., the swinging
motion of hammering, the repetitive finger contractions when
cutting with scissors). In an early study, we therefore asked
whether a tool that was applied appropriately to a goal object
would help identify the goal of an action (Bach et al., 2005).
Participants had to judge whether two objects could, in principle,
be used together to achieve an action goal (e.g., screwdriver and
slot screw vs. screwdriver and slot of a keyhole), but had to ignore
whether the orientation of the tool relative to the goal object
matched the associated manipulation (e.g., same orientation for
screwdriver and screw, but orthogonal orientations of scissors
and piece of paper). We found that incongruent manipulations
slowed down judgment times, but only for object combinations
that suggested a goal; for those that did not, even when otherwise
physically possible (e.g., a screwdriver that would fit into a key-
hole), this effect was completely eliminated. This is therefore in
line with the idea that goal inferences are automatically verified by
matching the actually observed action with the required manipu-
lation, but if no potential goal is identified in the first place, such a
matching does not take place. Similar findings have been provided
by different labs in both adults (van Elk et al., 2009) and children
(Sommerville et al., 2008).
If this conception of action understanding is correct, one
would predict that object information is key to the compre-
hension of observed actions, and should therefore also involve
strongly overlapping brain regions. We have recently tested the
idea that object-related activation is the primary driver of action
understanding (Nicholson et al., submitted). In an fMRI study we
showed participants a sequence of different everyday actions—
such as pouring a glass of wine, paying with a credit card, or
making coffee—while directing their attention either towards the
movements involved, the objects used or the goals of the actions.
Consistent with the affordance matching hypothesis, goal and
movement tasks produced markedly different brain activations,
while activations in the goal and object task were—to a large
extent—identical.
AFFORDANCE MATCHING GUIDES IMITATION
Evidence that affordance matching guides action interpretation
comes from research on imitation. There is ample evidence that
children’s imitation does not reflect a faithful copying of the
observed motor behavior, but is based on the goal. Unless the spe-
cific motor behavior appears crucial to goal achievement (or for
fulfilling social expectations, Over and Carpenter, 2012), children
try to achieve the same goal with actions that aremost appropriate
to their circumstances, that is, they emulate rather than imitate the
observed action (Gergely et al., 2002; see Csibra, 2008, for review).
If this is the case, and if affordance-matching contributes to these
goal inferences, then we should find that actions are specifically
imitated when matching the affordances of their goal object.
This indeed seems to be the case.When children observe others
reach with their hand to either their ipsilateral or contralateral ear,
they primarily attempt to reach for the same target object (i.e., the
correct ear), but do so predominantly with an ipsilateral reach,
thus ignoring how the actor achieved the goal, and choosing the
most appropriate reach for themselves (Bekkering et al., 2000). As
seen in Woodward’s study, therefore, the goal object determined
the interpretation of the action, and this goal served as the
basis for imitation while the movement form was neglected (for
further discussion on the role of goals in imitation, see Csibra,
2008; see Uithol and Paulus, 2013, for a critical look at such
interpretations).
Studies on adults confirm that specifically those actions
are imitated, which match the affordances of the goal objects.
Humans have a general tendency to automatically imitate other
people’s actions (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Brass et al., 2000;
Bach et al., 2007; Bach and Tipper, 2007). Wohlschläger and
Bekkering (2002) showed that imitation of simple finger tapping
movements is enhanced for themost effectivemovements towards
the goal objects (marked spots on a table), and this effect has been
linked to the inferior frontal gyrus, one of the assumed homologs
of monkey area F5, where mirror neurons have first been discov-
ered (Koski et al., 2002). In a recent study, we revealed similar
effects for automatic imitation of reach trajectories. Observers
specifically tend to imitate the direction of observed reaches,
if the configuration of the hand matched the size of the goal
object (Bach et al., 2011). Other studies have revealed similar
findings, showing that muscle activation induced by transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the motor cortex when watching
others grasp objects is higher when the observed grasps match the
affordances of the goal object (e.g., Gangitano et al., 2004; Enticott
et al., 2010).
RELATIONS TO RECENT ACCOUNTS OF MIRROR NEURONS
AND ACTION UNDERSTANDING
The above review shows that the affordance-matching hypothesis
can unify a range of recent findings on children’s and adult
action observation. However, we believe that it is also in line
with the single cell evidence, particularly with findings about
mirror neurons in the macaque premotor and parietal cortices
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Fogassi et al., 2005). Recently, several
theorists have started to re-evaluate the thesis that mirror neurons
are part of a bottom-up mechanism for action recognition (e.g.,
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), and—in line with the affordance
matching hypothesis—instead highlighted their role in matching
sensory input to top-down action expectations (e.g., Kilner et al.,
2007a; Csibra, 2008; Liepelt et al., 2008a; Bach et al., 2010b, 2011).
Csibra (2008), for example, argues that initial inferences about
the goal of an observed action are not based onmotoric matching,
but driven by contextual information in the scene (e.g., prior
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knowledge about others’ intentions, eye gaze, emotional expres-
sion, etc.). Once such an initial goal has been inferred, the job of
the mirror neurons is to produce an “emulation” of an action that
would be suitable to achieve this goal, based on the observers’ own
action knowledge. Their firing signals a match between observed
action and this emulation, and therefore allows observers to
confirm that the correct goal was inferred. In contrast, if there
is no such match between predicted and observed action, the
inferred goal is revised, and a new—hopefully better matching—
emulation can be produced. As proposed by affordance matching,
this emulation does not only serve such an interpretative function,
but also aids action prediction. Especially during visual uncer-
tainty, the emulation can be used to “fill in” action information
not obtained directly through perception (for recent evidence for
such a filling in, see Avenanti et al., 2013a).
Kilner’s (2007a; see also Grafton and de C. Hamilton, 2007)
predictive coding account follows a similar principle. The mirror
system is seen to be part of a hierarchy of reciprocally connected
layers, with goal information at the top and motor or kinematic
information at the bottom levels. As in Csibra’s model, initial
goal inferences are derived from contextual information in the
scene. Guided by the observers’ own action knowledge, these
goals are translated into predictions for forthcoming movements
and fed into the lower levels. Incoming sensory stimulation is
matched against this signal and elicits a prediction error in case
of a mismatch. The next level up can then alter its own prediction
signal to reduce this mismatch. As in (Csibra’s 2008) model, this
sparks a chain of forward and backward projections through the
interacting levels, where different goals can be “tried out”, until
emulation and visual input overlap and the prediction error is
minimal.
In such views, therefore, the firing of mirror neurons is
interpreted not as the autonomous detection of an action goal
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), but as the detection of a
predicted motor act that is in line with a previously inferred
action goal (cf. Bach et al., 2005, 2010b). The affordance-
matching hypothesis agrees with these general ideas. Both of these
prior views, however, are relatively vague about how contextual
information influences prediction and interpretation. With the
notion of coupled function and manipulation knowledge, the
affordance-matching hypothesis introduces a specific mechanism
via which such goal inferences can be made and translated into
predictions of forthcoming motor acts. Indeed, in the following
we will review some key pieces of evidence that suggest that
response conditions of mirror neurons are not only in line with
predictive accounts (see Kilner et al., 2007a; Csibra, 2008), but
specifically with the notion that knowledge of how to manipulate
objects drives these prediction processes.
MIRROR NEURONS AND AFFORDANCE MATCHING
A classical finding is that mirror neurons fire only for actions
that are directed at an object (be it physical, such as a peanut, or
biological, such as a mouth), but not if the same body movement
is observed in the absence of an object (i.e., mimed actions).
This finding is often interpreted as showing that mirror neurons
encode the goal of an action: the goal of reaching for something
rather than the motor characteristics of the reaching act itself
(Umilta et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). However,
in the light of the affordance matching hypothesis, an alternative
interpretation is that the firing of the mirror neurons confirms a
specific action that has been previously predicted, based on the
affordances of the object (e.g., a reach path on track towards the
object location with a grip that is appropriate for the object size).
In the absence of an object, no specific grasp is predicted, and
hence the mirror neuron remains silent even if one occurs (for a
similar argument, see Csibra, 2008). Such an interpretation does
not deny that the firing ofmirror neurons is goal-related; however,
rather than encoding the abstract goal of grasping itself, it suggests
that the firing of mirror neurons might signal a movement that
matches a functional object manipulation.
Another important aspect are the various reports of object
specificity of mirror neuron responses. Consider, for example,
that mirror neurons fire consistently only for motivationally
relevant objects, like food items (Gallese et al., 1996; Caggiano
et al., 2012). For abstract objects, such as spheres or cubes, firing
subsides quickly after the initial presentations. This is directly in
line with our proposal that the selection of objects for which the
affordances are extracted is guided by the functional relevance
of the objects towards the actor’s goals. Consistent with this
interpretation, it has recently been revealed that while a large
number of mirror neurons respond preferentially to objects that
had been previously associated with reward, a smaller number
fire specifically for objects that are not associated with reward
(Caggiano et al., 2012). This separate encoding of the same motor
acts towards different object types reveals that mirror neuron
responses are dependent on object function: they allow observers
to disambiguate predicted action goals (here: to gain a reward or
not) by matching them to the different movements suitable to
achieve these goals.
Another important finding is that mirror neurons in the
parietal cortex fire based not on the observed movement itself,
but based on its ultimate goal (Fogassi et al., 2005). That is, even
when merely observed, the same reaching action is encoded by
different mirror neurons depending on whether it is performed
with the ultimate goal of placing the objects somewhere else, or
eating it. Again, this finding is often interpreted as revealing a
coding of the action goal, but it is also in line with the matching of
different predictions based on object context. The reason is that,
in this experiment, the different goals were not extracted from
movement information (the initial grasps were identical for both
goals), but by object information: grasps to place were signaled
by the presence of a suitable container in reach of the model,
while grasps to eat were signaled by the absence of this container
(see supplementary material, Fogassi et al., 2005). The finding
therefore provides direct support for affordance-matching: mirror
neurons fire not because they autonomously derive the goal of the
action, but because they detect an action that has been predicted
from the presence of objects (for a similar argument, see Csibra,
2008).
An untested prediction of the affordance-matching hypothesis
is that mirror neurons should encode the specific motor act
expected by the object. They should therefore fire specifically, or
most strongly, for a motor act afforded by the object. A mirror
neuron encoding precision grips during own action execution
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should fire most strongly not only if a precision grip is observed,
but also if the observed object is one that affords a precision
grip (i.e., a small object). In contrast, a mirror neuron encoding
whole hand prehension should fire most strongly if a power
grip is observed towards an object that affords a power grip
(a large object). Some suggestive evidence for such an object-
action matching process was provided by Gallese et al. (1996).
They reported, first, that some grasping andmanipulation-related
mirror neurons only fired for objects of specific sizes, but not
for larger or smaller objects (but without providing details on
whether size and grip had to match). Second, they reported that
mirror neurons do not fire even if the monkey sees a grasp and
an object, unless the hand’s path is indeed directed towards the
object, revealing mirror neuron responses do not only require
object presence, but (1) a specific type of object; and (2) a precise
targeting of the action towards the object, in line with a matching
of action to object affordances.
Similar evidence comes from recent studies on humans that
have linked the matching of observed movements to those
afforded by the objects to areas in premotor and parietal cortex,
the brain regions where mirror neurons have been discovered in
the macaque monkey. During grasp observation, these regions
become activated when computing the match between grips and
objects (Vingerhoets et al., 2013), and respond more strongly
for reach errors, specifically when a reach deviates from the
path predicted by the object (Malfait et al., 2010). Similarly,
in the domain of tool use, they are involved in computing the
match between an observed manipulation and the manipulation
required to realize the object’s function (Bach et al., 2010b). Of
course, the conclusion that these affordance-matching related
activations in humans indeed reflect mirror neurons need to be
interpreted with caution, as none of these studies assessed a role
of these regions in motor performance. However, it is noteworthy
that the response of these regions correlates with the observer’s
sensorimotor experience with the actions (Bach et al., 2010b), a
criterion that has been proposed for identifying mirror neurons
in humans (cf. Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006). Moreover, the
parietal activations overlap tightly with the foci identified in a
recent meta-analysis on grasp execution (Konen et al., 2013), and
the peak coordinates overlap with regions with mirror properties
identified by a recent meta-analysis (Molenberghs et al., 2012).
Activations in the premotor cortex are particularly close, with
peak voxels in the Malfait et al. (2010) and our own study (Bach
et al., 2010b) falling within 5 mm of the peaks identified in the
meta-analysis.
OPEN QUESTIONS AND FURTHER PREDICTIONS
An open question is how these affordances, which ultimately
inform mirror neuron responses, are derived. During own action
execution, this role appears to be played by the canonical neu-
rons, which fire both when the monkey executes a specific grip
and when it views an object that can be manipulated with this
grip. These neurons therefore appear to derive object affordances
and specify how an object should be interacted with. Indeed,
if the bank region of F5—the region where canonical neurons
are primarily located—is inactivated, object-directed grasping is
disrupted as well (Fogassi et al., 2001). In contrast, inactivation of
the convexity of F5, the area where mirror neurons are primarily
located, does not produce such execution impairments, merely
slowing down the monkey’s actions. It has therefore been argued
that, while canonical neurons derive the appropriate grip, mirror
neurons play a monitoring role, providing the monkey with
“assurance” (p. 583) that its action is on track (Fogassi et al., 2001,
see also, Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010; Fadiga et al., 2013).
A similar division of labor—between deriving object affor-
dances and matching the actually observed action towards this
prediction—might happen during action observation. A recent
study (Bonini et al., 2014) has provided evidence for specialized
“canonical-mirror neurons” inmonkey area F5 that appear to play
the role of affordance extraction for other people’s actions. These
neurons respond both when the monkey sees an object in extrap-
ersonal space, and if somebody else performs an action towards
it. In contrast to typical canonical neurons, their responses are
not constrained to the monkey’s peripersonal space, and to an
object orientation most suitable for grasping. In line with our
hypothesis, the authors therefore argued that these neurons might
provide a “predictive representation of the impending action of
the observed agent” (p. 4118).
Other data points may, at first glance, show a less obvious
link to the affordance-matching hypothesis. One example is the
finding that a subset of mirror neurons that respond to grasping
will also respond—after training—to grasps of the actions with
a tool (Umilta et al., 2001; Ferrari et al., 2005). This finding
is often taken as evidence that mirror neurons encode higher-
level goals (“grasping”) rather than the relevant motor behaviors
themselves. A slightly different explanation is provided by the
affordance-matching hypothesis. On this view, mirror neurons do
not generalize across different motor acts subserving the same
goals, but across different perceptual cues that are informative
of action success. For example, a mirror neuron that originally
tests grasp success by monitoring fingers closing around an object
may learn that the same success condition is met when the end
of pliers close around the object. In other words, learning enables
the tool tips to be treated like the tips of one’s own fingers (cf.
Iriki et al., 1996). Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with
the encoding of goals of mirror neurons. However, rather than
encoding the abstract goal of grasping something, mirror neurons
would encode a lower-level perceptual goal state of effectors—be
they part of a body or of a tool—close around a target object.
A similar argument can be made for the finding that a large
number of mirror neurons are only broadly congruent, typically
showing a more specific tuning during action execution than
observation. For example, during execution, one neuron might
fire only when the monkey grasps an object with its hand, while
during observation it may fire for grasps with both hands and
mouth (cf. Gallese et al., 1996). If one takes a monitoring view
of mirror neurons, such differences may emerge naturally from
the differential availability of perceptual cues during action and
perception. Note for example that during observation one has a
view of other people’s hands and mouths, but not during one’s
own actions. A neuron that simply checks whether a body part
is on a path towards a target object can therefore perform this
test on hands and mouths during perception, but only for hands
during execution, giving the impression of a stricter tuning. We
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believe that such and other differences in the input available
during perception and action—such as prior action selection
processes or different action capabilities of monkey and model—
might give rise to the otherwise surprising response profiles of
broadly congruent mirror neurons. However, to what extent such
hypotheses can be supported by evidence is currently unclear, and
a full integration into the current model will therefore be the
subject of future work.
EXTENSION TO OTHER ACTION TYPES
The affordance-matching hypothesis contrasts with initial views
of action understanding as a bottom-up process (e.g., Rizzolatti
et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni, 2009),
where observers simulate the outcome of actions based on their
prior knowledge about motor commands and their perceptual
consequences. Our contention is not that affordance matching is
the only way that object-directed actions can be understood, but
that it provides a fast and efficient means for action interpretation
and prediction for well-known everyday object directed actions.
Actions involving unknown objects, for example—or actions with
common objects used in unusual ways—might benefit from a
bottom up approach that combines a simulation of the motor
actions with the mechanical properties of the objects to derive
likely action outcomes. Indeed, recent work has revealed such
processes of “technical reasoning” during planning of object-
directed actions (e.g., Osiurak et al., 2009), and studies on action
observation have shown that mirror-related brain areas become
activated specifically for actions that are not known (e.g., Bach
et al., 2011, 2014; Liew et al., 2013). However, even in these
cases top-down processes can contribute, if one assumes that the
relevant function and manipulation knowledge is tied not only
to objects as a whole, but to certain object characteristics as well
(e.g., any hard object can be used for hammering if it is brought
down in force onto the recipient object). Future work will need to
establish more closely the boundary conditions that decide which
of these two pathways to action understanding and prediction are
chosen.
Our discussion has so far focused on manual object-directed
actions, which are often seen as the paradigmatic case of human
action. However, there is no reason why similar processes may not
govern the perception for actions made with other body parts.
Walking, for example, one of our most frequent daily actions,
happens in an object context, and the paths we take are governed
by the objects (and people) surrounding us, and their relevance
to our goals. Such actions should therefore be predicted and
interpreted in a similar manner as manual actions. Thus, in the
same way as observers can predict that a thirsty actor will grasp a
glass of water in front of them, they can predict the path the actor
would take to a glass on the other side of a room.
The same argument can be made for other cues that guide our
social interactions, such as eye gaze and the emotional expressions
that typically accompany it. Most of these actions are again
object-directed, and observers implicitly understand this object-
directedness (Bayliss et al., 2007; for a review, see Frischen et al.,
2007; Wiese et al., 2013). People look at objects and may smile
or frown in response to them. Knowing how objects relate to
the actor’s goals therefore allows one to predict future looking
behavior and emotional expressions, which, in turn, can confirm
these goal inferences. Various studies now confirm the presence of
prediction or top down effects in gaze and expression understand-
ing. For example, Wiese et al. (2012) recently demonstrated that
the classical gaze cuing effects—the extent to which an observer’s
attention follows another person’s gaze—is not driven only by
stimulus information but by intentions attributed to the other
person.
For other types of action, the link to object knowledge is less
clear. Sometimes, observers do not have any information about
objects used in an action, for example because the relevant objects
are hidden from view (e.g., Beauchamp et al., 2003), or because
the action is pantomimed (e.g., during gesturing, Hostetter and
Alibali, 2008; Bach et al., 2010a). Here, therefore, the required
manipulation cannot be retrieved from the visible objects, but
from a much larger variety of possible manipulations in memory.
Identifying an object that would match this movement should
therefore be relatively slow and effortful, unless the observed
movements are highly idiosyncratic, or likely objects have already
been pre-activated by assumptions about the actor’s goals or con-
textual cues. However, as soon as a matching object-manipulation
pairing is identified, the action can be interpreted and predicted in
a similar manner as for fully visible actions (for evidence for such
a prediction of pantomimed actions, see Avenanti et al., 2013b,
albeit without linkage to object centered mechanisms).
Intransitive actions—such as stretching or spontaneous
smiles—are another example. They produce motor activation
just like the observation of object directed actions (Costantini
et al., 2005; Romani et al., 2005; Urgesi et al., 2006), but they
are, by definition, excluded from the present model. As they
are neither directed at an object, nor do they involve objects as
an instrument, object knowledge can therefore not contribute
to their interpretation and prediction. We speculate, however,
that their processing may follow similar principles. As it is the
case for object-directed actions, intransitive actions link certain
kinds of movement (e.g., stretching) with a specific function,
typically with reference to one’s internal state (e.g., to relieve some
symptoms of tiredness). If such a linkage exists, it can provide
similar predictive and interpretative functions as the analogous
knowledge about objects. Knowing about someone’s internal
state, may allow one to predict forthcoming actions. Observing
these actions, in turn, can then disambiguate possible interpre-
tations about the individual’s internal states. However, there is
still considerable debate in the literature about how intransitive
actions are processed when observed. Future research needs to
disentangle these processes, and more closely describe how they
interact with one’s (inferred) knowledge about a person’s internal
states.
CONCLUSIONS
Several recent proposals have challenged the idea that a motoric
matching process, instantiated by the mirror neuron system, is
the key driver of action understanding in humans. Yet, they have
left open which alternative source of information could be used
instead. The affordance-matching hypothesis posits a key role
of objects. It specifies how action prediction and interpretation
arises from a combination of object knowledge—how it is used
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and what it is for—and the actor’s current goals and motor
behaviors. Such a view can account for a variety of findings and
integrates them into a common framework. Moreover, it provides
an intuitive account of how the understanding of others’ actions
can be grounded in one’s own experiences. For the perception of
everyday object-directed actions, this grounding does not result
from amatching of motor parameters, but is based on the identity
of the objects, and one’s prior experiences about their function
and use.
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